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COMMENTS
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW-MERGERS-AN UPDATING OF THE
"FAILING COMPANY" DOCTRINE IN THE AMENDED SECTION

7

SET-

1

TING-Section 7 of the Clayton Act was enacted to supplement
the operation of the Sherman Act2 in preserving the competitive
system of our economy by preventing monopoly and undue concentration in American industry.3 As enacted, section 7 was intended to reach concentration by mergers in their incipiency and
before they reached the level of restraints of trade or monopoly
probabilities under the Sherman Act. 4 However, the original
sec_tion 7 soon appeared to be an inadequate tool to accomplish
this purpose, primarily because it prevented only acquisitions of
stock and not of assets. 5 In 1950, the section was amended to
reach any acquisition of stock or assets which might substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.6 Thus strengthened, section 7 has been utilized by the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission with considerable success in
preventing unlawful mergers and in disentangling those which
have already occurred.7
Even though application of section 7 has become increasingly
effective, a specific exception to its coverage has been recognized
by Congress8 and the Supreme Court.9 This exception is commonly referred to as the "failing company" doctrine. In short.
the doctrine holds that an acquired or to-be-acquired firm which
is in a "failing" condition, or the acquiring corporation, may
64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
Sherman Act §§ I, 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1958).
s See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962); H.R. REP. No. 1191,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949); 96 CONG. R.Ec. 16433 (1950) (remarks of Senator O'Conor).
See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
4 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914) provided: "[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition
may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so
acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in
any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
5 See Arrow-Hart &: Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); FTC v.
Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). For a brief summary of § 7's weaknesses prior
to the 1950 amendment, see REPORT OF An'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. To STUDY THE ANTI·
n.usr LA.ws 115-17 (1955). For a discussion of the doctrine, see Wiley, The "Failing
Company": A Real Defense in Horizontal Merger Cases, 41 B.U.L. R.Ev. 495 (1961).
6 See note I supra.
7 See Handler &: Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act, 61 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 629 (1961).
s See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1950); 96 CoNG. R.Ec. 16434-35 (1950).
9 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
1
2
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interpose this condition as a defense to any prosecution under
section 7 seeking to prevent or undo the acquisition of the failing
company's stock or assets by the other. This discussion will attempt to explore the development of the doctrine, consider its
significance and justification in our competitive system, and suggest possible guidelines for its application.
l.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE "FAILING COMPANY"
DOCTRINE PRIOR TO

1950

The first attempt to formulate an exception to the antitrust
laws based on the potential financial failure of a competitor was
made in American Press Ass'n v. United States,1° a Sherman Act
prosecution. In that case, the American Press Association was
acquired by Western Newspaper Union, its only competitor in
the relevant printing market. The acquisition was held not to
result in an undue restraint of trade or the creation of a monopoly
within the meaning of the Sherman Act since it was not injurious
to the public interest, but, on the contrary, was beneficial to the
public.11 Supporting this contention were the facts that: (a) the
market was in decline, with American and Western representing
the only survivors; (b) American had been losing 3,000 dollars
per month and was not able to build the modern printing facilities
necessary to enable it to achieve competitive status; and (c) there
were no other probable buyers for the failing firm's assets. These
facts convinced the court that if the merger had been prevented
American would soon have failed, leaving Wes tern as the sole
producer in the industry. 12 Injury to the public would have resulted from the destruction of a usable plant, and stockholder
damage would have been represented by the lost value of the
company as a going concern and the constantly diminishing worth
of its idle assets. The court indicated that an agreement between
American and Wes tern setting prices at levels sufficiently high to
provide profits for American would have avoided the consequences
of failure and maintained a competitor in the field. This solution
would still have caused the public to suffer, however, since the
public would have been paying for the "profitable operation of
an inefficient concern [which] is an injury," and, therefore, it was
rejected. 13 Under either remaining alternative-allowing the pur245 Fed. 91 (7th Cir. 1917).
Id. at 93.
12 Ibid.
1s Ibid.
10

11
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chase, or preventing it with the ultimate consequence that American would fail-Western would still remain alone in the industry.
Since the merger course would not increase the injury to the public that was likely to occur regardless of the choice, and would be
beneficial in the respects outlined above, the court concluded that
the purchase did not violate the antitrust laws.
This defense again appeared, although not in definitive form, in
the first Aluminum Co. case,14 where the Aluminum Company and
the Cleveland Company had devised a complex plan for joint
ownership in a third company to be formed-the Aluminum Rolling Mills Company. The court found, in this section 7 case, that
such a transaction would have the effect of substantially lessening
competition between the Cleveland Company and the Aluminum
Company, and, in addition, that the purchase of the Rolling Mills
stock by the Aluminum Company would tend to create a monopoly.15 The Aluminum Company contended that its intent was not
to by-pass the Clayton Act but rather to gain capacity to meet the
demands of war production and to relieve Cleveland of a difficult
business situation in which it was incurring losses. 16 The majority
opinion summarily dismissed this contention indicating that effect
rather than motive was controlling, and found that the effect here
was illegal under the act. The dissent, 17 on the other hand, argued
that the transaction represented a prudent business decision with
a legitimate purpose. If it had been otherwise, the Aluminum
Company could merely have waited a short time until both Cleveland and Rolling Mills had failed and then acquired the Rolling
Mills stock or assets.
The second Aluminum Co. case18 bore out the prophecy voiced
by the dissent in the earlier decision. 19 With the Cleveland Company having permanently terminated all business activities, the
Aluminum Company indicated that it would bring a creditor's
bill to collect on notes owed to it by Rolling Mills, which itself
had ceased operations. The FTC sought to prevent this action on
the ground that the Aluminum Company, as the judgment creditor, would acquire the assets at the ensuing sheriff's sale, which
result would be contrary to the holding in the first Aluminum Co.
14 Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied,
261 U.S. 616 (1923).
15 Id. at 408.
16 Ibid.
11 Id. at 409-11.
18 Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 299 Fed. 361 (3d Cir. 1924).
10 284 Fed. at 409-11.
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case. The court decided that since Cleveland had withdrawn from
the industry and Rolling Mills was competitively dead, section 7
would not deprive a creditor of his right to collect debts owing to
him in the manner prescribed by law.20
The true foundations of the "failing company" doctrine were
laid in the famous Supreme Court decision in International Shoe
Co. v. FTC. 21 In that case the International Shoe Company had
acquired the stock of the W. H. McElwain Company in a transaction involving two of the largest shoe manufacturers in the
world. The Court held in the alternative that: (I) the two companies were not competitors in the relevant market and, accordingly, there was no indication that the merger might substantially
lessen competition; 22 and (2) section 7 should not be applied
where the acquired company is in a failing condition23 (this latter
holding being the prime concern of this discussion).
The facts supporting the second holding2 4 indicated that the
McElwain Company had sustained a loss in excess of 6,000,000
dollars in 1920, which had wiped out its surplus and left a deficit
of about 4,900,000 dollars. The corporation also owed 15,000,000
dollars to banks and trust companies and an additional 2,000,000
dollars on current accounts. In 1921, production had fallen to
about 15 percent of capacity, and dividend payments had stopped
on common and second preferred stock and were to be discontinued on first preferred. Finally, the annual filing of the financial
statements required by the law of Massachusetts would have disclosed the firm's insolvency and brought it to the point of involuntary liquidation.
Against this setting the situation of International Shoe was
vividly contrasted.25 The company was in excellent financial condition and its efficiency had even justified a reduction in its shoe
prices. Business had increased by about 25 percent and the company found itself unable to fill its orders due to a lack of capacity.
McElwain approached International Shoe with the idea of selling
out. The merger was accomplished by means of exchanging securities rather than by purchase of assets, so that the acquired facilities
could be put into operation quickly by existing personnel. After
20
21
22
23
!H

25

299 Fed. at 365.
280 U.S. 291 (1930).
Id. at 299.
Id. at 302-03.
Id. at 299-300.
Id. at 300-01.
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summarizing the above facts, the Court indicated that the possible
alternatives open to McElwain, such as securing additional loans
or receivership, were, at best, speculative and provided no assurance that such action would save the corporation. The acquisition,
therefore, would not be invalidated merely because such alternatives existed.26
That oft-quoted paragraph which has been interpreted as the
first concrete formulation of the "failing company" doctrine then
followed:
"In the light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation
with resources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation
so remote that it faced the grave probability of a business
failure with resulting loss to its stockholders and injury to
the communities where its plants were operated, we hold
that the purchase of its capital stock by a competitor (there
being no other prospective purchaser), not with a purpose
to lessen competition, but to facilitate the accumulated business of the purchaser and with the effect of mitigating seriously injurious consequences otherwise probable, is not in
contemplation of law prejudicial to the public and does not
substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce within
the intent of the Clayton Act. To regard such a transaction as
a violation of law, as this Court suggested in United States
v. U.S. Steel Gorp., 251 U.S. 417, 446-447, would 'seem a distempered view of purchase and result.' See also American
Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 Fed. 91, 93-94.''27
The importance of this paragraph28 necessitates a careful examination of its language and structure, both now, and, in more detail,
later.29 The Court initially reiterated the factual conclusions in
the case and then applied a doctrine which focused upon the
motive of the purchase and the probable effect on the public if
section 7 were construed to prevent the merger.
As a result of the line of authority culminating in the International Shoe decision, the concept of a "failing company" defense
had passed beyond the amorphous state and had at least been
crystallized to the extent that its existence as a possible justificaId. at 301-02.
Id. at 302-03.
28 This paragraph has been relied on by Congress as authority for its assertion that
the "failing company" doctrine does in fact exist as an exception to § 7, and that it
should remain so under the amendment (see note 8 supra).
29 See text at 574, 582-83 infra.
26

21
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tion for an otherwise unlawful merger was acknowledged. ·No attempt had been made at a thorough definitive assessment of the
thrust and import of the doctrine, however, and it received no
further serious attention until after the passage of the 1950 amendment to section 7.30
IL

RECOGNITION AND TREATMENT OF THE DOCTRINE SUBSEQUENT
TO

p ASSAGE

OF AMENDED SECTION

7

The legislative history relating to the amended section 7 of
the Clayton Act contains expressions by Congress of its intent
to exclude from the statute's coverage bankruptcy and receivership cases, and to extend the exclusion to situations where the
acquired company was not in a state of bankruptcy, but was heading in that direction with the probability that bankruptcy would
ensue. 31 Thus, "the bill would not apply to a company in a failing
or bankrupt condition." 32 In expounding a definition of the doctrine, both the Senate and the House contented themselves with
reciting the previously quoted and well-known passage from International Shoe. 33 It is perhaps unfortunate that Congress did not
verbalize its own thoughts as to the scope of the defense. This has
led some writers to doubt that the doctrine exists at all; 34 nevertheless, it has been since recognized in numerous judicial and administrative decisions. 35 Indeed, Representative Celler, co-sponsor
of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment to section 7, in hearings
on a possible later amendment of the act to include banks,86 reaffirmed the House report in stating that "any entity that would
30 In Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S.
743 (1944), the court in dictum indicated that a firm closing out its business because
of financial difficulties could sell its facilities to a competitor without violating the
antitrust laws.
31 See note 8 supra.
32 96 CoNG. REc. 16435 (1950).
33 See text at note 27 supra; see also note 8 supra.
34 This view has been expressly stated in Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act:
The "Failing Company" Myth, 49 GEo. L.J. 84 (1961); see also Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 421,
427 (1959).
35 See Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1961); Erie
Sand &: Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1961); United States v. Diebold,
Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961), rerld, 369 U.S. 654 (1962); United States v.
Maryland &: Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 799, 808-09 (D.D.C. 1958), affd
in part and rev'd in part, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26, 47-48
(1956). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 331 (1962), where the
Court recognized the intent of Congress to preserve the "failing company" doctrine.
36 Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 7, at I (1955).
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be in a bad condition, could be taken over without violating the
law." 37
Recent cases in which the defense has been raised have not
indicated a willingness by the courts to grapple with the conceptual problems involved in delimiting the scope and application of the doctrine. In these cases, the firm in question was usually
either growing and profitable or hopelessly insolvent and on the
brink of bankruptcy. In Farm Journal, Inc., 38 it was determined
that the purchase of the "Country Gentleman," a national farm
magazine published by Curtis Publishing Company, by Farm
Journal, the publisher of the only other national farm magazine,
was in violation of the act. One of the defenses interposed was
that "Country Gentleman" had been in a failing condition and
had incurred large losses in recent years. 39 In rejecting this defense40 the Commission indicated that Curtis itself was financially
successful and its large surpluses could have been used to establish
"Country Gentleman" magazine as a profitable enterprise. The
holding was based essentially on the determination that, in order
for the doctrine to apply, the firm itself, and not merely one of
its endeavors, must be in a failing state.41 The Commission also
relied on the shaky financial condition of the acquiring company,
Farm Journal, to distinguish this case from International Shoe. 42
The strength of the acquiring company's business position
may, in several respects, justify a court in sustaining the defense.
First, it indicates a legitimate need for the capacity, which negates
the claim that the motive for acquisition was illegal; 43 and, secondly, the sound financial condition of the acquirer tends to insure
that the injury which the courts wish to prevent will, at least, be
mitigated by keeping the facilities in operation and avoiding
financial collapse.44 A valid motive for acquisition and the mitigation of probable injury can be found in Farm Journal, as well as
in International Shoe, although in a somewhat different form.
37 Id. at 10. This quote was in the context of a general discussion considering the
necessity of inserting an "escape" proviso in the amendment to insure· that those banking
corporations faced with a possibility or probability of ultimate failure would be allowed
to merge. It was felt that the doctrine of International Shoe covered this particular
situation and therefore the proviso was not needed. Id. at 9, 10.
38 53 F.T.C. 26 (1956).
39 Id. at 47.
40 Id. at 47•48.
41 Ibid.
42 Id. at 48.
43 See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 301 (1930).
44 Id. at 302.
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Thus, the declining market for national farm magazines warranted
a reduction in capacity, and merger has been recognized as one of
the most painless and efficient means of accomplishing this legitimate end.45 It is interesting to note that by the time the decision
was handed dmrn the merger question had become practically
moot:16 Curtis had ceased publication of "Country Gentleman"
and Farm Journal had, for a considerable period, fully incorporated the valuable assets acquired by the transaction, such as advertising lists, subscriber lists, and use of the name "Country
Gentleman" in conjunction with "Farm Journal." Divestiture at
that late date was essentially a hollow remedy.
The defense was again raised in Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v.
FTC, 47 where a liquidating corporation had sold out to the highest
bidder, which happened to be a large competitor. In striking down
the defense, the court stated that the mere fact the board of directors had made a final decision to liquidate the company did not
permit what had been a prosperous firm up to the point of sale
to come under the protection of the doctrine. 48 "The picture
presented by the prosperous Sandusky Division here was the antithesis of such a 'failing company' situation"49 (referring to the
condition of McElwain in International Shoe). Speaking of the
defense, the court suggested that it may be permitted when the
corporation is in such dire financial straits that its termination and
subsequent dispersal of its assets seems inevitable. 50 In determining
whether the doctrine would be applicable in a particular case, the
court indicated that the proper approach would involve a balancing with the possible injuries to the adverse interests involved. 51
For example, the probable damage to competition that may result
if the merger is validated should be weighed against the likely
injury to creditors, owners and employees of the corporation if
it is prevented from selling out and thereafter fails. The precise
45 Each of the two national farm magazines were sustaining substantial losses, and,
therefore, the situation is similar to and probably more dire than that involved in
American Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 Fed. 91 (7th Cir. 1917), where the antitrust
laws (Sherman Act) were held not to apply. See also S. REP. No. 132, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. 24 (1957), in which Professor Weston of the University of California is quoted:
"Mergers may represent the most effective method of achieving stability and progress
at certain stages of industrial development. It may represent the most efficient method
of combining facilities and disposing of obsolete and inefficient properties."
46 Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26, 49-51 (1956).
47 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
48 Id. at 280-81.
49 Id. at 281.
liO Id. at 280.
ul Id. at 281.
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holding of the case, however, was less broad. In order for a firm
which has decided to go out of business to qualify under the
defense it cannot have been in a healthy condition at the time
of acquisition, but rather must have exhibited failing characteristics. 52
Perhaps the most restrictive interpretation of the doctrine
was rendered in Pillsbury Co.53 The initial position taken by the
Commission was that International Shoe must be limited to its
facts. Thus, if a firm sought to qualify for this exception, evidence
must be submitted to prove that the company had been in a desperate situation, with (1) resources depleted, (2) rehabilitation remote, and (3) the possibility of failure imminent.54 It is important
to remember that these three elements, which apparently represented the FTC's approach to the defense, were extracted from
the characterization of the facts in the critical paragraph of International Shoe. No importance was attached to the holding which
followed upon this characterization. Indeed, in attempting to
reduce the potency of the "failing company" exception, it was
suggested that there might be no exception at all. 55 After exhibiting a somewhat negative attitude toward the doctrine, the Commission was nevertheless willing to apply the broad test suggested
by respondent company, 56 namely, whether there was a reasonable probability that, if the merger had not been allowed, insolvency or bankruptcy would have ensued. Even under this
standard the Commission concluded that the burden had not
been sustained by the respondent. The summary of the facts indicated a healthy enterprise with a long growth and profit history
which was under some financial pressure due to a shortage of
working capital.57 In addition, there had been prior offers to
purchase the firm and another bid was outstanding at the time
of the acceptance of Pillsbury's offer. 58
The essential facts in Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTCr, 0 bearing on the relevance of the doctrine were similar to those in
Pillsbury Co. The history of the purportedly "failing" company
52

Id. at 280-81.
REG. REP. (1960-61 FTC Gas.)
Id. ,I 37629.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Id. ,I 37628-29.
Id. ,I 37630.
296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).

53 TRADE
54

55
li6
57
58
59

fl

29277, at 37617 (1960).

1963]

COMMENTS

575

involved indicated a growth of net worth, net assets and net sales. 60
The company had been generally profitable during the ten-year
period prior to its acquisition, although its earnings had slacked
off toward the end of this period,61 and it had experienced difficulty
in financing an expansion and modernization program. 62 After
enumerating these facts the court determined that at the time of
acquisition, the acquired corporation was an effective competitor
of the acquirer, and there was no sufficient reason to believe that
it was in a failing or bankrupt condition. 63 No attempt was made
to define the "failing company" exception or its scope.
The "failing company" defense was successfully employed in
United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n64 and, more
recently, in United States v. Diebold, Inc. 65 In the Milk Producers
case the court had before it for consideration the acquisition of
three dairies in the same relevant market by a milk producers'
co-operative. The purchase of the assets of the Embassy Dairy was
condemned because of the horizontal and vertical threats to competition that it posed. 66 In contrast, the acquisition of the other
two dairies was permitted under the doctrine of International
Shoe. 61 Of these two companies, one had ceased operations altogether because of financial difficulties while the other was hopelessly insolvent, being deeply in debt to the acquirer and on the
brink of bankruptcy.68
In the Diebold case,69 the court listed many factors which
tended to portray the corporation as one hopelessly insolvent and
faced with imminent receivership. 70 The acquisition was, therefore, not violative of section 7. The court felt that the acquired
company, because of its desperate financial condition, could not
long have survived as an independent competitor and that an
alternative sale could not have been secured.71 Injury to employees,
creditors and stockholders of the failing corporation upon the
60 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1961).
61 Id, at 832.

Id. at 831.
Id. at 832.
167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958).
197 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961).
167 F. Supp. at 807.
Id. at 808-09.
Id. at 808.
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961). On appeal to
the Supreme Court, the decision was reversed on a determination that the facts were
not sufficient to establish a basis for summary judgment. 369 U.S. 654 (1962).
70 197 F. Supp. at 903-05.
11 Id. at 907.
62
63
64
65
66
61
68
69
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probable liquidation of the firm was cited as the justification for
recognition of the defense. 72 It is significant that the court buttressed its conclusion by observing that after the merger there
had been a continued decline in the amount of business attributable to the operation of the acquired facilities; and, but for the
merger, the acquired firm would have unquestionably experienced
a total business collapse.73

III.

THE SIGNIFICANCE AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE "FAILING
COMPANY" DOCTRINE IN THE SECTION

7

SETTING

It is abundantly clear that none of the cases have adequately
undertaken a thorough examination of the conceptual elements
contained in the "failing company" defense, or of the appropriate
criteria to be used in testing a particular factual situation. Since
the facts in these decisions were either extremely favorable or unfavorable to the interposition of the defense, there was no need to
explore critically the gray area in determining the scope of its
application. However, there was language in some of the decisions
which indicated that the rule of International Shoe was based on
the absence of a substantial lessening of competition between the
firms because the acquired failing firm had no longer been able
to compete effectively with the acquiring corporation.74 While
this interpretation might have been possible under the old section 7,75 it is fallacious to assume that these grounds would necessarily support an acquisition examined under the standards of
amended section 7.76 It must be remembered that the proscribed
Ibid.
Id. at 906-07.
74 In United States v. Maryland &: Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 709
(D.D.C. 1958), the court stated that the acquisition of capital stock or assets is not
within the ban of § 7 "because the acquisition of a failing corporation that is on the
verge of going out of business cannot result in lessening competition or in creating a
monopoly." Id. at 808. Similar indications can be found in Pillsbury Co., TRADE R.I:c.
REP. (1960-61 FTC Cas.) ,r 29277 (1960), in rejecting respondent's contention that the
defense applied. "This would be so even if, as respondent contends, the International
Shoe case establishes an absolute defense in Section 7 cases, rather than merely estab•
lishing imminent insolvency as one of the relevant factors in assessing competitive
effect." Id. ,r 37629. (Emphasis added.) The language in United States v. Diebold, Inc.,
197 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961), although somewhat ambiguous, tends to support a
similar interpretation. Thus, the merger "did not threaten, or actually cause a lessening
of competition within the meaning of Section 7 ...•" Id. at 907. See also Connor, supra
note 34, at 98-99; Webster, The Clayton Act Today: Merging and Marketing, NEw YoRK
STATE BAR .ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 74, 100 (CCH 1955); Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1627,
1663-64 (1959). Compare Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 340 (1960).
75 See note 4 supra.
76 Clayton Act § 7, as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), provides:
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
72

73
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activity has been expanded by the amendment to cover the acquisition of assets as well as stock, and is applicable to vertical as
well as horizontal mergers; nor is it limited merely to the lessening
of competition between actual competitors.77 Furthermore, recent
judicial interpretations78 have indicated that investigations for
violation can focus on submarkets and subproducts, thereby including within the sweep of amended section 7 a greater variety
of acquisitions than were reached by its predecessor.
It is not difficult to imagine situations where acquisition of a
competitively feeble firm would not have created a substantial
lessening of competition under the old act, but would be condemned under the amendment unless there exists a true exception
to section 7. Purchase by a dominant firm of the assets of a competitively dying company could have the following anti-competitive effects.
(a) It would enable a dominant firm to move quickly and
cheaply into a new market by acquisition of a failing company
where, but for the doctrine, the transaction would be in violation
of section 7. 79
(b) By increasing the acquiring firm's capacity to fill orders
which it would otherwise be unable to accept, the company could
strengthen its position in the market and prevent competitors
from handling the overflow of business that would otherwise resuit. 80
(c) By removing productive facilities from the market a poor any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part
of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
77 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Maryland & Va.
Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
78 E.g., see authorities cited in note 77 supra.
70 Except for the lack of a failing company, this situation was presented in United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), in which the merger of United States
Steel with Columbia Steel escaped Sherman Act condemnation. According to Senator
Kefauver, "if section 7 of the Clayton Act had been amended as the [then] pending
bill propos[ed], the acquisition which was made by the United States Steel Corp. in
that case would not have been permitted." 96 CONG. R.Ec. 16502 (1950). Since United
States Steel and Columbia Steel were not competitors in the relevant market, the
import of this statement must be that acquisition of existing facilities by a dominant
firm is in itself anti-competitive.
so In International Shoe Co. v. FTC, the Court indicated that International Shoe
had been forced to cancel orders because of insufficient capacity. 280 U.S. at 300-01.
Therefore, if it were necessary to build new facilities, the time delay would presumably
have caused a diffusion of orders throughout the industry to other competitors.
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tential entrant might be forestalled from entry since he would
face the increased cost of building new facilities and having these
new facilities swell the total productive capacity of the market. 81
(d) The acquiring firm would probably obtain less of the
business of the defunct company if the latter experienced total
business collapse than if it effectively stepped into the shoes of
the failing company and appropriated the remaining good will
plus valuable customer lists, price data and other important business information.82
(e) Of increasing importance, a large enterprise could vertically integrate by purchasing a failing company and thereby eliminate a customer of or supplier to other competitors, depending on
whether the integration was backward or forward, respectively,
which might result in a substantial lessening of competition in
the relevant market. 83
(f) Such an acquisition might give the acquiring firm an increased percentage of the market and increased market dominance,
which has in itself been viewed as an undesirable result. 84
This summarization of possible anti-competitive consequences
of a failing firm merger is not intended, however, to support the
hypothesis that there should be no "failing company" doctrine.
Rather, it is designed to shed light on the problems that must be
realistically faced in any consideration of the applicability of the
doctrine. In short, it must be realized that the doctrine represents
a valid exception to section 7, and, but for the exception, the transaction would be illegal as violative of the antitrust laws.
It is reasonable to assume that Congress foresaw that substan81 Professor Weston pointed out that "for many reasons the securities of a company
may be selling below replacement costs of the firm's assets." S. REP. No. 132, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. 23 (1957). Thus, a potential entrant who must build new facilities would be
faced with greater costs than if he could have purchased the existing assets. Professor
Weston also indicated that most companies would desire to increase their own capacity
without expanding that of the market generally. Ibid. It is logical to assume that a
new entrant faced with existing competitors would not wish to create a greater capacity
in the market which would tend to increase the amount of competition he would face.
82 Compare Comment, supra note 74, at 1663-64.
83 See authorities cited in note 77 supra.
84 Where one of the largest producers of aluminum products acquired one of eight
competitors in the relevant market of aluminum "florist foil," it was held to be in
violation of § 7, even though the large producer had not been in the field prior to
acquisition. Reynolds Metals Co., 56 F.T.C. 743 (1960). The Commission specifically excluded as the grounds of the decision such factors as a possible lessening of competition
through vertical integration, or the long growth history of Reynolds by means of
merger. Id. at 774. Apparently the basis of the decision was that there was an actual
lessening of competition because Reynolds, due to its size and resources, had upset the
status quo of the market and caused some of the previously evenly balanced competitors
to begin incurring losses. Id. at 774-76.
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tial advantages to the public could be obtained by engrafting an
exception on the apparent commands of section 7.85 Although
overlapping and intertwined, various economic, business, competitive and social justifications support recognition of the doctrine. First, a doctrine which allows a company to sell out before
it has taken the "last gasp" in its business life minimizes the probable injury to employees, creditors, shareholders and the community in which the facilities are located. 86 The sale of plant and
equipment as a going concern would probably result in continued
operation of the facilities, thereby continuing to afford jobs to the
employees and support to the community. 87 The value of a going
concern would be greater than the income received from the distress sale of its assets,88 and creditors would be more likely to collect their debts and shareholders could salvage a greater proportion of their investments.
Secondly, the determination of whether a declining company
has, in fact, reached the "last-gasp" stage so as to assure the legality
of its acquisition under section 7 may be an extremely difficult
one. Since there is no clear-cut guide as to when the corporation
has qualified under the exception, other than when in receivership or bankruptcy, this may cause the parties to hesitate at the
prospect of a merger until the "last gasp" has indeed been taken,
with the consequence that the corporation will then have already
lost most of its value as a going concern. In addition, there might
well be no buyer at this late date willing to burden itself with
such a decaying company.
Thirdly, the public might best be served by allowing a firm
which will probably fail to leave the industry at the earliest possible time. By doing so, the inefficient producer would be weeded
out before there has been a lengthy misallocation of resources. 89
For example, an efficient enterprise that is working at overcapacity
could acquire a failing company with unused capacity, thereby
maximizing the output of both.90 Similarly, the "last gasp" test
85 See 96 CoNG. REc. 16435 (1950).
86 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. ITC, 280
87 As pointed out by the former Chairman of the

U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930).
Federal Trade Commission, Edward
F. Howrey, the major reason for mergers is the desire by the acquiring firm to obtain
additional capacity without creating increased competition. This was cited as the primary
motive in two out of five mergers. S. REP. No. 132, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1957). It is
obvious that, with this motive, the acquired facilities would be kept in operation
with resulting benefits to the community.
88 See American Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 Fed. 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1917).
811 See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 51-55, 437-39 (1959).
DO This situation was present in International Shoe Co. v. ITC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
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may be injurious to the public if it keeps an inefficient submarginal producer in the industry, thereby tying up additional resources that under a normal competitive situation would be
diverted into more productive activities which benefit the whole
economy.91
Finally, the "last gasp" approach does not take cognizance
of modern business and economic realities. There may be circumstances in which a firm is faced with a probability of failure even
though it has not as yet experienced a long loss history or become
insolvent. Great technological advancements in certain industries
which substantially lower the cost per unit ratio might soon place
a company that cannot avail itself of these advancements in the
"definitely failing" category.92 Many reasons exist for the inability
to take advantage of technological advancements. A company
might not have sufficient business volume to achieve the "economies of scale"93 inherent in the new methods and machinery which
would be required to derive profits from the investment. The
huge outlay required for purchase of such technology may be a
factor preventing such action. A possible market decline might
put the squeeze on the efficient, and especially the inefficient producer, 94 with ordinary business sense dictating to the latter that
the large investments necessary to become competitive are not
justified. Another problem faced by the marginal and submarginal
firms might be the increased cost of production.95 Thus, costs
which are tolerable to an efficient company could force a low or
no profit producer to the realization that the business's end is
near. A prime example of this is so-called "pattern bargaining," 96
by which the gains of labor at the expense of an efficient company
are imposed on the less efficient members of the industry.97
91 See BAIN, op. cit. supra note 89, at 437-39. The misallocation there outlined in a
"distress" industry would probably be present where a "distress" firm was producing at
undercapacity and heading toward failure.
92 Id. at 206-07, 439-46.
93 Id. at 146-49. "Economies of scale" represents that volume of production which
will permit the lowest cost per unit operation of e.xisting plant and facilities, which
thereby tends to maximize profits.
94 Id. at 579-83, where a prime example of this condition, the bituminous coal
industry, is discussed.
95 This situation is present whenever an industry is faced with increases in wages,
materials and costs of distribution.
96 "Pattern bargaining" is present when an industry-wide labor organization bargains
with one or a few large firms in the industry. The results achieved from such collective
bargaining are thereafter presented to the remaining firms who are strongly urged to
follow the pattern set by the prior agreements.
97 See S. REP. No. 132, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1957) (reported remarks of George
A. Romney, former president of American Motors Corp.).

1963]

COMMENTS

581

Therefore, since Congress intended to allow for a "failing company" defense, it appears, from a public interest standpoint, that
such a defense is not only justified, but should be available as
soon as it can reasonably be determined that the corporation is
irreversibly headed toward final collapse. Little is to be gained
from requiring a corporation to have taken the last gasp of its
business life before an otherwise illegal acquisition would be
permitted.

IV. A

SUGGESTED STANDARD FOR APPLICATION OF THE
"FAILING COMPANY' DEFENSE

Concededly a construction of the "failing company" exception
which departs from the relatively certain guidelines of actual bankruptcy, receivership or insolvency will require the courts to formulate standards which will be more difficult to apply. Nevertheless, as previously indicated, Congress98 and the Supreme
Court99 have considered the exception sufficiently important to
engraft it upon section 7. While not conclusive, some indication
of recent acceptance of the doctrine can be gleaned from the
history of the Diebold case, in which the Department of Justice
did not attempt to disclaim the existence of the exception; 100 and,
even in reversal, the Supreme Court101 gave no indication that
the doctrine lacked vitality, but only stated that the facts of the
case were not sufficiently established to support the summary
judgment of the district court which applied the doctrine in favor
of the acquiring firm. Therefore, keeping in mind that it is an
exception to the section, and but for the exception the acquisition would be condemned, the following represents a suggested
approach to the problem which, it is submitted, summarizes the
intent of Congress and is implicit in various case decision~.102
Simply stated, the suggested approach would employ a balancing test by which the apparent injury to competition in the relevant market, which is likely to occur if it is determined that the
acquisition may substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly, would be weighed against the probability of countervailing injury to the community, owners, employees and creditors,
See note 8 supra.
oo International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
100 United States v. Diebold, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio, 1961).
101 United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962) (per curiam).
102 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930); Erie Sand
&: Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1961). See also Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 331, 334, 346 (1962).
98
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and to the economy generally (through misallocation of resources).103 This would require a two-pronged Rule of Reason
prognostication after it is determined that the merger would otherwise violate section 7. Considering all relevant factors, there would
, first be a determination as to whether the declining firm would
have eventually terminated in failure, and, second, a consideration
of whether the acquisition was the most reasonable way to achieve
the desirous "effect of mitigating seriously injurious consequences
otherwise probable.''104 This would, in turn, require considera•
tion of past financial and business history of the corporation, profit
and loss trends and relevant market developments, as well as, if
applicable, increased cost data. Other factors which determine
whether the firm could reasonably be expected to have remained
a competitive force during the period of prognostication must also
be considered. This would entail an analysis of costs for additional
capital improvements; a judgment whether these additional investments could have been undertaken by the firm without excessive risk or whether the outlook for development and profits
in the market would not have justified such an outlay; and, finally,
a determination of whether the present and potential volume of
the firm would sustain the maximum utilization of additional
facilities so as to achieve the economies of scale inherent in its
operations. To aid in obtaining as accurate a forecast as possible,
if there has been a sufficient time lapse, evidence should be admitted indicating conditions after the transaction was consummated, keeping the court abreast of current developments. 105
Application of the doctrine would not eliminate the requisite
attempts to obtain alternative buyers whose acquisition of the
stock or assets would not be in violation of the act. The effort to
be expended by the failing firm in this regard would be inversely
proportional to the state of decline exhibited by it; but there
should always be a duty of the firm to solicit more than one buyer.
The question of required acceptance of lower bids from an acceptable bidder is indeed a difficult one. Frequently the least acceptable prospective acquirers will be in a position to bid the
most.106 Again, all that can be suggested is that the acceptance
103 The weighing of the probability of ultimate failure is not an unfair approach
since, in essence, it is balanced against another probability test, the § 7 standards.
104 International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930). See also Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962).
105 The approach was taken in United States v. Diebold, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902, 906
(S.D. Ohio 1961).
106 This is because, as the dominance of the firm that wishes to acquire increases,
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of the bid from such a purchaser should have appeared to be the
most reasonable choice under the circumstances. A court would
balance such factors as the state of decline of the firm, the effort
expended by the firm to obtain other offers, the number of bids
made, the differences in the bids, and the difference between the
lower bids and that amount likely to be realized if the failing
company were forced to sell at a distress sale. Similarly, a court
should not undermine the defense merely because there were
legal alternatives available unless it is shown that such alternatives
could have reasonably been expected to have averted the acquired
or to-be-acquired company's otherwise probable failure.
International Shoe 101 is consistent with this approach once it
is realized that the case involved two giants in the shoe industry.108
The probability of injury by the lessening of competition or the
tendency to create a monopoly was so great that the scales of the
test were about as heavily weighted in favor of preventing merger
as possible. Therefore, in order to allow the merger in the face
of the statutory provisions, the countervailing injury probable in
the event of failure would also have to have been great, as would
the likelihood of failure itself. Increased probability of injury on
the one side would have to have been balanced against that on the
other side. Both parties were confronted with the severest possible
fact situations, and still the scales tipped in favor of the "failing
company" doctrine. With this in mind, that most important paragraph in the Court's opinion can be construed as establishing a
true exception to the general scope of section 7, in providing
" ... that the purchase of its [the failing firm's] capital
stock by a competitor (there being no other prospective purchaser), not with a purpose to lessen competition, but to
facilitate the accumulated business of the purchaser and with
the effect of mitigating seriously injurious consequences
otherwise probable, is not in contemplation of law prejudicial to the public and does not substantially lessen competition within the intent of the Clayton Act. To regard such a
transaction as a violation of the law . . . would 'seem a distempered view of purchase and result.' " 109
Philip Sotiroff, S.Ed.
the greater is the likelihood that it is in a position to offer a larger sum, and the more
objectionable would be the purchase.
101
10s
109

280 U.S. at 301-02.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 302-03.

